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Abstract
This paper provides a novel theory of the international business cycle grounded on ￿rms￿
entry and sticky prices. It shows that under simple monetary rules pro-cyclical entry can
generate ￿ uctuations in consumption, output and investment as large as those observed in the
data while at the same time providing positive international comovements and highly volatile
terms of trade. The capacity to capture these stylized facts of the international business cycle
overcomes the well-known di¢ culties of the standard open economy real business cycle model
in this regard. Numerical simulations show that ￿ oating regimes exacerbate counter-cyclical
markup movements. Fixed regimes, on the other hand, lead to an increase in the volatility of
￿rm entry.
Keywords: product variety, ￿rm entry, international business cycle, monetary policy, interest
rate rules, exchange rate regimes.
JEL codes: E31; E32; E52
1 Introduction
This paper provides a novel theory of the international business cycle grounded on ￿rms￿entry and
sticky prices. It shows that under simple monetary rules pro-cyclical entry can generate ￿ uctuations
in consumption, output and investment as large as those observed in the data while at the same time
providing positive international co-movements and highly volatile terms of trade. The capacity to
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inars 2010), University of Istanbul (EcoMod 2010), University of Crete (ICMAIF 2010) and Birmingham Business
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1capture these stylized facts of the international business cycle overcomes the well-known di¢ culties
of the standard open economy real business cycle model in this regard. In the baseline model of
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995), negative co-movements arise as a consequence of the strong
incentive to use inputs where they are most productive. In the low productivity economy, input
costs rise through factor price equalization and employment and investments fall. This need not
be the case as long as a business cycle expansion in one country leads to additional entry in the
trading partner￿ s market. This paper shows that pro-cyclical entry and counter-cyclical markups
indeed provide a channel for positive co-movements.
I study business cycle co-movements in a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with monopolistic competition where producers are subject to a sunk entry cost, a one-period
production lag and to an exogenous exit shock. The world economy features complete ￿nancial
markets and full specialization in goods markets.1 Nominal rigidity is captured by sticky prices ￿ la
Calvo (1983). Monetary policy is represented in the standard form of a feedback rule as in the Neo-
Wicksellian framework (Woodford (2003)) and the global nature of the monetary regime is captured
by the interaction of interest rules followed by the monetary authorities in the two countries. I
consider two ￿ oating regimes, one with symmetric Taylor rules and the other with interest rate
smoothing, and a regime where the exchange rate is ￿xed at all dates. The dynamics of the model
under these simple monetary rules is compared with the ￿ exible price equilibrium, the so-called
Wicksellian regime. In the model, investments occur at the extensive margin and are driven by the
expectation of future pro￿ts from introducing a new variety into the market. Investments depend
crucially on the monetary rule in place.
In a scenario with ￿ exible prices (where monetary policy is neutral and in￿ ation is zero), potential
investors anticipate that they will be able to stabilize their pro￿ts by setting prices at a constant
markup over marginal costs. A business cycle expansion in one country leads to additional entry in
domestic markets with unchanged markups. In the trading partner, risk sharing leads to an increase
in income that reduces labor supply (via inter-temporal substitution), raises the costs of inputs and
induces ￿rms￿exit. Investments ￿ ow in the most productive economy as in the typical real business
cycle model, resulting in negative co-movements. Numerical simulations show that the response of
new investments to the rise in productivity is extremely large. In the absense of nominal rigidity
my model delivers excessive volatility in investments as in the typical RBC model without costs of
1Incomplete ￿nancial markets are required to explain the near zero cross-country correlation in consumption.
The assumption of risk sharing together with the assumption that all goods are traded imply that agents will in
principle be able to move resources (investments and employment) in the most productive economy, thereby generating
negative co-movements. They are unable to do so under sticky prices.
2capital adjustment.
Entry behavior turns as volatile as in the data whenever prices are sticky. The prospective
of incurring in price distortions in the future discourages potential entrants everything else equal.
Remarkably, I ￿nd that relevant distortions materialize under all simple monetary rules considered,
in ￿xed as well as in ￿ oating regimes, and despite monetary authorities manage to control in￿ ation
over the cycle. A more realistic response of investments, in turn, ameliorates the capacity of the
model to generate empirically plausible co-movements. Investors anticipate that their pro￿ts will
￿ uctuate over the cycle in a pro-cyclical way while their markups will move counter-cyclically as
long as prices are sticky. In the low productivity economy, pro-cyclical pro￿ts mitigate the negative
impact of risk sharing on labor supply, resulting in positive co-movements.
Comparing the dynamics of the model across monetary rules, the paper ￿nds that the exchange
rate regime is a key determinant of market entry. In numerical simulations where productivity shocks
are the main source of business cycle volatility, ￿ oating regimes exacerbate counter-cyclical markup
movements. In order to see why, consider a rise in domestic productivity. Home entrepreneurs
quickly exploit the pro￿t opportunities associated with falling marginal costs at home and massively
enter domestic markets. The price of home varieties reduces and the more so the higher and more
persistent the appreciation of the domestic currency. As a consequence, markups will sharply drop
in ￿ oating regimes. Markup adjustment to (endogenous) changes in exchange rates is compatible
with a wide evidence documenting that international goods markets are e⁄ectively segmented and
the degree of exchange rate pass-through into ￿nal prices is far from complete. Fixed regimes, on
the other hand, lead to a rise in the volatility of new investments, especially after a monetary policy
shock. The ￿nding rests on the capacity of ￿xed exchange rates to isolate domestic markets from
external shocks, thereby providing a safe environment for potential investors. The ￿nding accords
with the evidence provided in Bergin and Lin (2008) showing that exchange rate stability positively
in￿ uences the extensive margin of trade, particularly in monetary regimes that are characterized by
a high degree of international policy coordination, as monetary unions and hard pegs.
The paper contributes to a fast-growing literature that investigates the implications of producer
entry and product creation for the business cycle propagation and policy.2 From a theoretical
perspective, these models overcome the unappealing implication of their ￿xed-variety predecessors
that imperfectly competitive markets provide unexploited pro￿t opportunities. The introduction
of more realistic assumptions on ￿rms￿dynamics, in turn, appears to ameliorate the capacity of
2See, among others, Ghironi and MØlitz (2005), Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007), Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti
(2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2005, 2011).
3arti￿cial economies to reproduce empirically plausible patterns for macroeconomic aggregates over
the cycle. In a closed economy, Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2005, 2007) show that the moments
generated by their models with endogenous entry come very close to the data, outperforming the
typical ￿xed-entry real business cycle model.
Our knowledge, however, is still very limited as regards the role of entry in the international
business cycle. In a pioneering paper, Cook (2002) shows that counter-cyclical markups can generate
positive co-movements under very strict conditions. It is required a combination of sequential entry,
time varying capital utilization and incomplete ￿nancial markets. Other early attempts to model
entry in open economy have mainly focused on explaining ￿ uctuations in the extensive margins of
trade and foreign investment. In all these contributions, monetary policy is either overlooked (as in
Ghironi and MØlitz (2005) and Helpman, MØlitz and Yeaple (2007), among others) or considered as
an exogenous source of business cycle variability (as in Russ (2007) and Cavallari (2007, 2010)). Yet,
there are good reasons for studying monetary policy in a model with ￿rm entry. Recent evidence
documents that a monetary easing, i.e. a drop in the nominal interest rate, has a positive impact on
the number of ￿rms entering the market, suggesting that monetary policy may play a relevant role in
a ￿rm￿ s decision whether to start-up a new production line.3 Open economy models with monetary
policy and ￿rm entry include Auray, Eyquem and Poutineau (2010) and Auray and Eyquem (2011).
The former ￿nds that a model with entry can replicate the volatility of the extensive margin of trade
found in the data. The latter focuses on the cyclical properties of trade ￿ ows. Both papers draw on
a two-country version of the model in Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium conditions.
Section 3 provides the main equations of the log-linear model and section 4 presents numerical
examples. Section 5 concludes. The appendix provides the steady state and the whole log-linear
model.
2 The model
The world economy comprises two countries labelled Home, H, and Foreign, F, each specialized in
the production of one type of good as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2002). Each country is populated by a
continuum of agents of unit mass. A typical agent in the economy is both a consumer and a worker:
he supplies labor services in a competitive labor market and consumes all the goods produced in the
world economy. In the Home country, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms,
3See Bergin and Corsetti (2008), Lewis (2009) and Uusk￿la (2010) among others.
4each producing a di⁄erent variety of the Home good h 2 (0;NH), where NH is the number of Home
￿rms. Similarly, in the foreign country there is a continuum of ￿rms f 2 (0;NF). The stocks of
Home and Foreign producers are determined endogenously in the model.
2.1 Preferences
A typical agent i in country J = H;F derives utility from consuming a composite index of all the
goods produced in the world economy, C, and from holding real money balances, M
P , while derives
disutility from labor e⁄ort, L. 4 Agents maximize the expected discounted value of ￿ ow utility U



























where ￿ > 0 is the inter-temporal elasticity, ￿ > 0 the elasticity of real money balances and ’ > 0
is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
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4Unless otherwise stated, nominal variables are expressed in domestic currency. So MF, for instance, denotes the























I assume that prices are set in the producers￿currency and that the law of one price holds, i.e.
P H(h) = "P F(h) and P H(f) = "P F(f), where " is the nominal exchange rate de￿ned as the price
of currency F in terms of currency H. In this setup with ￿rm entry, the assumption is less restrictive
than it might appear at ￿rst. Firms can actually insulate the ￿nal price of their products from
￿ uctuations in nominal exchange rates by adjusting their markups. Numerical simulations below
will show that this is indeed the case. Clearly, trade frictions do play a role in the decision whether
to access foreign markets in the ￿rst place and eventually whether to serve them with exports or by
engaging in investments overseas. The analysis of endogenous changes in trade openness or in the
mode of accessing foreign markets is beyond the scope of the present paper. 5
Finally, I de￿ne the terms of trade of country F , T, as the price of the bundle of goods produced













Producers in the world economy face an identical linear technology where labor is the sole factor.
Output supplied by a ￿rm j = h;f in country J = H;F is given by:
y
J





where ZJ is country-speci￿c labor productivity. Productivity is exogenous and follows an AR(1)
process in percent deviations from the steady state.
Prior to entry, ￿rms face a sunk entry cost fEJ for starting-up a new production line.6 The cost
is de￿ned in units of consumption, i.e. entry requires purchasing a basket of materials of amount
fEJwhich has the same composition as the consumption basket, C. Others, as Bilbiie et al. (2007),
5Cavallari (2010) provides a model with endogenous entry of export and multinational ￿rms. The currency of
denomination of international trade is found to a⁄ect both dimensions of the decision to serve foreign markets.
6One can think of sunk entry costs as administrative fees, licences or any other burocratic accomplishment which
is required before entering the market or as the cost for advertising the launch of new products.
6Bergin and Corsetti (2009) and Cavallari (2007) among others, de￿ne entry costs in e⁄ective labor
units. Entry in this case requires hiring a certain amount of workers. How to model entry costs is an
open question. It has implications for aggregate accounting: with entry costs in units of consumption,
for instance, output of the consumption sector coincides with GDP while this is no longer the case
when entry costs are in labor units. More importantly, it may a⁄ect the mechanism of monetary
transmission. A monetary easing can in principle lead to an increase or a drop in the real cost of entry
(and therefore to opposing responses on the part of entrants) depending on its e⁄ects on marginal
costs and total production. Comparing the implications of limited participation versus sticky price
models in a closed economy, Uusk￿la (2008) ￿nds that the predictions based on the production
channel, as in the former framework, come closer to the evidence of a negative relationship between
interest rate innovations and ￿rms￿entry. In sticky price models, on the contrary, a contractionary
monetary shock leads to a drop in market demand and consequently to a drop in the demand for
labor. Real wages and marginal costs will therefore fall, thereby favoring entry. As it will be apparent
soon, in my setup with entry costs in units of consumption, monetary policy in￿ uences entry through
the production channel, precisely via its e⁄ect on the consumption-investment trade-o⁄.
The entry cost is exogenous. As in Ghironi and MØlitz (2005), all ￿rms entered in a given period
are able to produce in all subsequent periods until they are hit by a death shock, which occurs with
a constant probability ￿ 2 (0;1): Therefore, a ￿rm entered in period t will only start producing at
time t + 1, introducing a one-period time-to-build lag into the model.
In each period, there is a ￿nite mass of potential entrants, NEJ: Entrants are forward looking
and decide to start a new production line whenever the real value of the new ￿rm, ￿, covers entry




















where the expression in square brackets is the present discounted value of future real pro￿ts, d.













I assume that ￿nancial markets are complete within and across countries by allowing agents to trade
in a set of nominal state-contingent bonds, B; denominated in the currency of country J = H;F that
7span all the states of nature.7 In addition to state-contingent bonds, a typical agent holds domestic






























































where W is the nominal wage and TR is a nominal transfer from the government.
Agents choose consumption, labor e⁄ort, money, share and bond holdings in period t so as to
maximize utility (1) over their whole life horizon subject to the budget constraint (9). Consumers￿
























































































Note that the Euler equation for bonds (10) together with the no arbitrage condition qH
t (st+1) =
"tqF




























7There exists a complete set of bonds which pay one unit of the domestic currency if state ￿t+1 occurs at time
t+1. The price of such a bond at date t is qJ(￿t+1).
8The assumption of complete markets together with the law of one price and the fact that consumption
bundles are identical across countries imply that consumption risks are fully insured worldwide, i.e.
CH = CF = C:
Finally, combining the Euler equation for shares (11) with the free entry condition (8) gives:
1 =












In spite of a constant value in present discounted terms, expected pro￿ts vary over the cycle. In the






=fEJ, to the real return on bonds in every period. As it will be apparent soon, sticky prices
can a⁄ect the way these expectations are formed and result in extensive deviations from the entry
behavior that would prevail with ￿ exible prices.
2.4 Pricing
Goods markets are monopolistically competitive. Each producer sets the price for its own variety




















I introduce nominal rigidities through a Calvo-type contract. In each period a ￿rm can set a
new price with a ￿xed probability 1 ￿ ￿ which is the same for all ￿rms, both incumbent ￿rms and
new entrants, and is independent on the time elapsed since the last price change. In every period
there will therefore be a share ￿ of ￿rms, comprising incumbents and entrants, whose prices are pre-
determined. In the symmetric equilibrium, pre-determined prices at a given point in time coincide
with the average price chosen by ￿rms operating in the market in the previous period. 8
The assumption that new entrants behave like incumbent ￿rms has the unappealing consequence
that a producer may get stuck in a past pricing decision he did not make. It would be plausible
to assume that entrants can make their ￿rst price-setting decision (at time t+1) in an optimal
way. With Calvo pricing, the assumption would imply that the pre-determined price in each period
coincides with the average price chosen by ￿rms entered in all previous periods and survived to the













and similarly for PF
F: These properties will be used in deriving the Calvo state equations below.
9death shock, with incumbents and entrants still facing the same price.9 This clearly has second
order e⁄ects which become irrelevant in the log-linear model. In a setup ￿ la Rotemberg with
quadratic costs of price adjustment, on the contrary, the assumption that entrants are subject to
the same nominal rigidity as incumbent ￿rms may have major consequences for the propagation of
the business cycle (see Bilbiee et al. (2007)). Allowing entrants to make their ￿rst price-setting
decision at no additional cost would in fact introduce heterogeneity in price levels across cohorts of
￿rms that entered at di⁄erent points in time. As the number of price setters that face no cost of
adjusting to a past pricing decision moves over the cycle, the aggregate degree of price stickiness
becomes endogenous. The analysis of endogenous changes in price stickiness is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Each ￿rm j = h;f sets the price for its own variety so as to maximize the expected discounted
value of pro￿ts, taking into account market demand and the probability that she might not be able








































+ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)EtP
J
t+1(j) (18)
where P J(j) averages a markup on current nominal marginal costs with the expected future price.
Clearly, when ￿ = 0 optimal pricing implies a constant markup ￿
￿￿1 on marginal costs. With sticky
prices, istead, (ex post) markups ￿ uctuate over the cycle. These movements will turn out to play a
key role in the international cyclical transmission.
Aggregating the expressions above across ￿rms and using the property that the pre-set price level








































10Observe that the producer price index in each period depends on the current and the past stock
of active ￿rms. An increase in the number of producers over time will reduce the aggregate price
level everything else given. This is a consequence of love for variety. A higher number of, say, home
varieties raises the value of consumption per unit of expenditure in home goods. Home producer
prices must therefore fall.
2.5 Aggregate accounting

























t di = 0 (20)






























Aggregating the budget constraint (9) across agents, using the government (20) and resource
constraint (21) and imposing the e quilibrium conditions sJ
t+1 = sJ
t = 1 and BJ
t+1 = BJ
t = 0 for any




















where Y J is real GDP in country J = H;F: Aggregate demand, as given by consumption plus
investments in new ￿rms, must be equal to total income (wages plus pro￿ts). It is useful at this













where the second expression follows from labor market clearing. It is easy to show that the expression
above satis￿es the aggregate constraint (22). Using labor supply (14) together with the property that
in equilibrium the inverse of the share of labor, Y JPJ
WJLJ, coincides with the price markup ￿J ￿
PJ(j)
WJ=ZJ,














































2.6 Interest rate rules
The model is closed by specifying the monetary policy rules in place in the world economy. I assume
that the monetary instrument is the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate, iJ
t , and consider the






where f is a generic function and ￿ is the information set at time t.
3 The log-linear model
The model is solved in logdeviation from a symmetric stationary equilibrium where in￿ ation and
exchange rate changes are zero. In this steady state the stochastic shocks are muted at all dates,
ZJ = fEJ = 1. This section discusses the main linearized equations while the Appendix contains
the steady state and the full loglinearization.
3.1 Demand block
The aggregate demand block is derived from the log-linear approximation to the ￿rst order con-
ditions of consumers in the Home and Foreign countries. Consumers allocate their wealth among
consumption, nominal risk-free securities and shares. Inter-temporal optimization requires that the
marginal rate of substitution between current and one-period ahead consumption must equalize the
real return on nominal assets, both the risk-free bonds and shares. A ￿rst set of Euler equations, one
for each country, will therefore describe the dynamic link between current and expected one-period
ahead consumption and relate it to the risk-free return in units of consumption. A second set of Euler
equations, again one for each country, will instead relate the inter-temporal pro￿le of consumption
to the real return on shares. The real value of the ￿rm, which coincides with the exogenous entry
cost in this model, is the forward solution to the Euler equations for shares.
Using the fact that consumption risks are perfectly insured in the world economy, the bond Euler
equations in the Home and Foreign countries can be combined, yielding:





















where a hat over a variable denotes the logdeviation from the steady state, ￿J
t+1 = lnP J
Jt+1=P J
Jt is
producer in￿ ation in country J = H;F and E is the expectation operator. The expression above
says that an increase in the world real interest rate, wherever it is originated, raises the return on
bonds, therefore making it more attractive to postpone consumption in the future.
From the de￿nition of the terms of trade (6), the following state equation follows:





Movements in the terms of trade around the steady state are driven by changes in the nominal
exchange rate and by cross-country in￿ ation di⁄erentials. Monetary policy can directly a⁄ect the
terms of trade through uncovered interest parity:






The supply block is derived from the log-linear approximation to the optimal pricing and entry
decisions of ￿rms in the Home and Foreign countries. First, consider the optimal price (17) for, say,











































where b P H
t;t+k = lnP H
t (h)=P H
H;t+k . Note that by de￿nition b P H





t+s; namely changes in
the real price of a home variety between t and t+k coincide with the variety e⁄ect, the ￿rst addend,





















































































+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿
F
t+1
The country-speci￿c in￿ ation rates depend on next period expected in￿ ation as well as on deviations
of the terms of trade, consumption, the number of producers and productivity from their steady
state values. Such deviations are correlated with current marginal costs. To begin with, consider an
increase in T, i. e. a deterioration in the home terms of trade. The rise in T switches world demand
in favor of home products, thereby increasing labor demand in the home economy. With endogenous
labor supply, this in turn requires an increase in nominal wages and therefore in marginal costs.
A similar mechanism explains why a rise in world consumption is associated with higher marginal
costs and higher in￿ ation. A rise in home productivity, on the other hand, directly reduces marginal
costs and therefore dampens in￿ ation. Finally, the number of producers is related to marginal costs
via the variety e⁄ect. An increase in the current stock of producers makes a larger array of varieties
available for consumption. Because of love for variety, this in turn increases the value of consumption
per unit of expenditure. Consumer prices therefore fall and reduce nominal wages via labor supply.
The opposing e⁄ect is true for a rise in the number of producers in the previous period. In this
case, the variety e⁄ect reduces past aggregate prices and wages resulting into higher in￿ ation in the
current period.
Second, using the fact that entry behavior is symmetric across ￿rms I derive a log-linear approx-















The law of motion of ￿rms is:
14b N
J
t = (1 ￿ ￿) b N
J
t￿1 + ￿ b N
EJ
t (30)
Finally, a log-linear approximation to the GDP equations (23) yields:
b Y
H
t = (1 + ’)(￿ ￿ 1) b Tt + (1 + ’)Z
H
t + (1 + ’)￿
H
t ￿ ’￿b Ct +
￿
1 + ’

















t = ￿￿ (1 + ’) b Tt + (1 + ’)Z
F
t + (1 + ’)￿
F
t ￿ ’￿b Ct +
￿
1 + ’















The ￿rst four terms in the expressions above capture the e⁄ect of changes in employment over the
cycle. In this model, only incumbent ￿rms can hire workers (entrants face costs in consumption units
and produce with a one-period lag) so that employment changes coincide with the internal margin
of output ￿ uctuations. Focusing on Home output, both an improvement in the home terms of trade
(a drop in T), an increase in home productivity, a drop in markups and a drop in consumption
lead to an increase in labour supply in equilibrium and therefore to higher employment and higher
output. For a given number of producers, this in turn implies an increase in ￿rms￿size. The last
three terms capture the e⁄ects of changes in variety. In a scenario with ￿ exible prices (￿ = 0),
output increases only as long as the current stock of producers rises (the external margin of output
￿ uctuations). With sticky prices, these movements become more persistent. Moreover, output
changes are positively correlated with in￿ ation.
3.3 Interest rate rules
I consider one regime with ￿xed exchange rates and two ￿ oating regimes.
The ￿xed regime is a unilateral peg to the Foreign currency featuring a ￿xed exchange rate at
all dates. It is implemented by the interest rule b iH
t =b iF
t ￿ ￿b "t for any ￿ > 0:The rule says that the
Home nominal interest rate is pegged to the Foreign interest rate and reacts to the deviation of the
exchange rate from a desired target (normalized to zero). The exchange target is necessary in order
to overcome a potential problem of indeterminacy. In order to see why, consider uncovered interest
parity (27): exchange rate expectations are zero whenever the Home and Foreign nominal interest
rates are equalized. The simple ruleb iH
t =b iF
t ; however, would leave the level of the nominal exchange
rate undetermined.
15The second regime features a symmetric Taylor rule where the nominal interest rate in each




t . The Taylor principle, requiring that policy-
makers react more than proportionally to in￿ ation, i.e. ￿
J
￿ > 1, insures nominal determinacy.10
Taylor rules have been extensively analyzed since the seminal paper by Taylor (1993). They are
empirically plausible, especially in the last few decades when the objective of price stability has
gained a major role in monetary policy-making.
Finally, I consider a smoothing regime where nominal interest rates depend on their past values.
In particular, I focus on smoothing Taylor rules as b iJ




t . The rationale for smoothing
rules draws on the desire to reduce swings in interest rates in an environment characterized by long
and variable lags in monetary transmission.
For ease of comparisons with models that feature ￿ exible prices, I also consider a Wicksellian
regime in which the nominal interest rate is set so as to reproduce the ￿ exible price equilibrium with
zero in￿ ation. The Wicksellian interest rates, e iJ; are given by:
e i
H
t = ￿(Et Ct+1 ￿ Ct) + (1 ￿ ￿)(Et Tt+1 ￿ Tt) (32)
e i
F
t = ￿(Et Ct+1 ￿ Ct) ￿ ￿ (Et Tt+1 ￿ Tt)
With ￿ exibe prices, nominal interest rates mimic changes in the world natural (real) interest rate.
As well-known, the Wicksellian policy can be implemented recurring to a credible threat to deviate
from the zero in￿ ation target. Policy-makers therefore follow the rule iJ
t =e iJ
t + #￿J
t for any # > 0.
4 Numerical experiments
In this section I explore the properties of the model by means of numerical examples. In the ￿rst
exercise, I focus on productivity shocks as the main source of business cycle volatility, abstracting
from innovations to monetary policy and entry costs, so as to facilitate comparisons with real business
cycle models. In the second exercise, I show the responses in the benchmark economy to a one-time
innovation in the nominal interest rate for the purpose of illustrating the mechanism of monetary
transmission.
10See Benigno and Benigno (2008) for a proof of the Taylor principle in open economy.
164.1 Calibration
I calibrate a US-EMU model in which country H is the US and country F the EMU 12. As these
economies contribute to world production in approximately the same way, I set ￿ = 0:5: In the
baseline calibration, periods are interpreted as quarters and ￿ = 0:99 as usual in quarterly models of
the business cycle. The size of the exogenous exit shock is 0:025 as in Bilbiie et al. (2007). The rate of
￿rm disappearance is consistent with a 10 percent rate of job destruction per year as found in the US.
Moreover, such a moderate rate does not overstate the capacity of the model to generate persistence.
The elasticity of substitution across goods ￿ is equal to 7.88 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999a),
resulting in a reasonable average markup of approximately 18 percent. Trade studies based on micro
data usually ￿nd a much lower ￿. The qualitative features of the impulse responses below do not
change with ￿ = 3:88.11 The Frisch elasticity ’ also follows the parametrization in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999a) and is set to 2.13. The inter-temporal elasticity is ￿ = 1 as in Bilbiie et al. (2007).
I experiment a full range of admissible values for ￿ and ’:
The degree of nominal rigidity is taken from Gal￿, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001). The value
for ￿ ranges between 0:407 and 0:66 in the US and between 0:67 and 0:771 in Europe. As in Benigno
and Benigno (2008), I take the middle points from these intervals and set ￿ = 0:49 in the US and
￿ = 0:72 in Europe, implying an average duration of nominal contracts of, respectively 2.3 and 3.65
quarters. I also experiment with a common value of 0:66 in the two countries as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999a), obtaining qualitatively identical responses. Initial conditions for productivity
shocks, the terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate do not a⁄ect the dynamics of the model
and can be set at unity without loss of generality.
4.2 Technology shocks
4.2.1 Moments
Quantitative properties of the theoretical world economy are reported in Tables 1 and 2 together
with properties in the data and in other comparable models. As with the data, statistics refer to
Hodrey-Prescott ￿ltered variables with parameter ￿ = 1600:
In order to by-pass the di¢ culty of available measures of in￿ ation to account for variety e⁄ects,
I express theoretical variables in terms of output whenever necessary, i.e. any variable that in the
model is measured in units of consumption will be de￿ ated by producer in￿ ation (multiplied by
P H=PH) and converted into units of output. I measure investments in the model with the real value
11Responses with ￿ = 3:88 are available upon request.








country J = H;F. This rule is consistent with a large evidence documenting the importance of
in￿ ation targets and interest smoothing for monetary policy-making while ￿nding only a marginal





I start with the co-movements of macroeconomic aggregates worldwide. In the data, co-movements
of output, consumption, investments and hours appear to be strikingly positive across a large num-
ber of countries, although cross-correlations are not too strong especially in more recent times (see
Ambler et al. (2004)). Panel A of Table 1 contains the cross-correlations of output, employment
and investment in the benchmark model with sticky prices, in the model with ￿ exible prices, in the
model of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) and in the data for Europe and the US from Ambler
et al. (2004). 12 Panel B contains the business cycle properties of the same variables in the three
models above and in US data from King and Rebelo (1999). To facilitate comparisons, I focus on
country-speci￿c productivity shocks with symmetric standard deviation equal to 0.0852, correlation
0.258 and persistence 0.975 as in Backus et al. (1995).
Table 2
A. International Co-movements
Model with sticky prices Model with ￿ ex prices Europe-US data BKK (1995)
Correlations of foreign and domestic variables
Y .96 -.61 .66 -.21
L .20 -.33 .33 -.31
NEH .39 -.99 .53 -.31
B. Business Cycle Properties
Model with sticky prices Model with ￿ ex prices BKK (1995) US data KR (1999)
￿X
￿X
￿Y ￿XY ￿X ￿X
￿X





C 1.90 .87 .97 .96 1.67 .22 .42 .97 1.44 .42 - 1.35 .74 .88 .84
Y 2.18 1 1 .97 7.49 1 1 .87 1.50 1 .62 1.81 1 1 .84
NEH 7.91 3.63 .57 .95 49.7 6.63 -.89 .85 20.88 10.99 - 5.30 2.93 .80 .87
L .72 .33 .97 .96 .14 .02 .03 .84 .95 .50 - 1.79 .99 .88 .88
￿X is the standard deviation of variable X, ￿XY is the correlation between variable X and Y and ￿X is the auto-correlation of variable X between t and t-1.
12Comovements of consumption are not reported as my model features perfect risk-sharing worldwide.
18The model with sticky prices remarkably reproduces positive co-movements of macroeconomic
aggregates, overcoming the well-known di¢ culty of standard open economy real business cycle mod-
els in this regard. It provides larger co-movements of output relative to those of employment and
investment as in the data, outperforming the model in Backus et al. (1995) also along this dimen-
sion. The theoretical cross-correlation of output, however, appears excessively high compared to the
data.
In Backus et al. (1995), negative correlations arise as a consequence of the strong incentive to
use inputs more intensively in the country where they are most productive. In their model, agents
are able to shift perfectly substitutable goods costlessly between countries and to trade in complete
markets for state contingent claims. They can therefore move production e⁄ort to the country with
the current higher technology shock. A similar mechanism applies in the ￿ exible price economy,
providing a performance close to that of Backus et al. (1995) in reproducing the international
business cycle. In the absense of price distortions within and between countries, investors can
establish new ￿rms where productivity is higher (the Home country in the simulation). This re￿ ects
in the model as a near perfect negative cross-correlation of investments and a negative correlation
of output between countries.
In the benchmark model, investments are much less volatile than with ￿ exible prices (by a factor
close to 7) although still more volatile than in the data. My intuition is that a lower volatility of
investments under sticky prices re￿ ects the limited ability of agents to move production where it is
more productive. In my setup, resources are shifted to the more productive location mainly through
investments in new varieties. Potential investors anticipate that failing to set prices in an optimal
way will reduce the prospective pro￿ts from investing in a new ￿rm for a given level of market
demand, thereby discouraging entry relative to the ￿ exible price economy. Moreover, they expect
variable pro￿ts (and markups) over the cycle. In the low productivity economy, pro-cyclical pro￿ts
help mitigate the negative impact of risk sharing on labor supply, resulting in positive co-movements.
It is worth stressing that the ability to generate positive co-movements does not come at the
cost of implausible business cycle properties. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the model with sticky
prices captures pretty well the volatility of output and employment as well as the smoothness of all
theoretical variables relative to output. The capacity to generate realistic measures of smoothness is
remarkable given the well-known di¢ culty of standard RBC models in this regard. The volatility of
consumption and investment, however, are excessive compared to the data.13 The model displays
13Asymmetric productivity shocks may play a role in this regard. In my setup, a rise in productivity favors
consumption of existing goods, implying a higher change in consumption for a given level of market demand (the
elasticity of consumption with respect to existing goods is less than the elasticity of substitution across varieties).
The volatility of consumption, in turn, is positively related to the volatility of investments via expected pro￿ts.
19too pro-cyclical patterns for consumption, as typical in RBC models. It outperforms the standard
RBC model in capturing the fact that investments are less pro-cyclical than other macroeconomic
aggregates, although the correlation with output is too low compared to the data. As regards
persistence, theoretical variables are strongly auto-correlated in both the models with sticky and
￿ exible prices while they are typically less persistent than in the data in RBC models.
Consider now the movements in the terms in trade. Despite ample heterogeneity across countries,
two stylized facts emerge with clarity. First, the terms of trade are highly volatile, far more volatile
than aggregate output although not as much as investments. Second, they are approximately a-
cyclical, in the sense that their correlation with output is uniformly very low (Baxter and Crucini
(2000)). Table 2 reports the volatility and cross-correlations of the terms of trade, output and
investments in the model with sticky and with ￿ exible prices and in the data for the US provided
by Baxter and Crucini (2000). The parametrization of the productivity shock is as before.
Table 2
Model with sticky prices Model with ￿ ex prices US data, Baxter and Crucini (2000)
￿X ￿X=￿Y ￿XT ￿X ￿X=￿Y ￿XT ￿X ￿X=￿Y ￿XT




NE 7.981 3.63 .34 49.70 6.64 .20 5.29 3.11 .11
PH
PH Y 2.18 1 -.004 7.49 1 .18 1.70 1 -.08
￿X is the standard deviation of variable X and ￿XT is the correlation between variables X and T.
The model with sticky prices is able to reproduce both empirical regularities. The terms of trade
are more volatile than output, more than twice as much in the model and a bit less in the data for
the US over the whole period (1955-1990). In line with the ￿ndings here, Baxter and Crucini (2000)
show that the volatility of the terms of trade has increased signi￿cantly after the oil shock in a large
number of countries, included the US. 14 The model also captures the fact that the terms of trade are
less volatile than investments and positively correlated with the latter. Finally, they are almost a-
cyclical as in the data. Under ￿ exible prices, the performance of the model in reproducing plausible
business cycle properties deteriorates, showing excessive volatility in all theoretical variables. As
noted earlier, high volatility re￿ ects the ability of agents to move resources where they are most
productive.
It is worth stressing that my model reproduces key features of the terms of trade without resorting
to implausible values for the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Typically,
14On average, the standard deviation of the terms of trade has increased from 2.75 before 1973 to as much as 4.27
thereafter. In the US, it jumps to 4.28 in the OPEC period (1973:1 to 1986:4).
20RBC models require a very low elasticity in order to generate swings in the terms of trade as large
as those observed in the data. In these models, a given change in market demand (net exports)
requires a change in prices (the terms of trade) that is higher the lower the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods. This has a twofold implication that the volatility of net exports is
linked to the volatility of the terms of trade (they are both high in the data) and the former can be
increased only at the expense of the latter. In my model, instead, movements in the terms of trade
are related to exchange rate changes and in￿ ation di⁄erentials between countries.
4.2.2 Impulse responses
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of Home variables to a 1 percent rise in domestic productivity.
The shock has a persistence of 0.975 as in King and Rebelo (1999) for consistency with second
moments.
The ￿gure displays the responses under four alternative monetary regimes, all symmetric across
countries: 1) the Wicksellian policy (star markers), iJ
t = e iJ
t + #￿J
t ;which provides the ￿ exible-price
equilibrium; 2) the Taylor rule (discontinuous line), iJ
t = 1:5￿J
t , where nominal interest rates
respond to domestic in￿ ation; 3) a rule involving interest rate smoothing (continuous line), which








t ￿ 0:2"t . In the ￿gure the
horizontal axis displays the periods after the shock, while responses denote deviations from steady
state (a value of, say, 0.01 indicates a 1 percent deviation).
Focus on the responses under ￿ exible prices. The rise in productivity lowers marginal costs
and real interest rates with expansionary consequences for consumption and GDP. The favorable
business environment, in turn, attracts more ￿rms into the home market and the number of entrants
increases. The pro-cyclical response of entry is consistent with ample evidence. 15 Note that the
response of investments is very large (around 40 percent) as typical in RBC models without costs
of capital adjustment. Moreover, entry concentrates in the early stage of the transition with the
number of entrants returning to the natural level in around 10 quarters and translating into a gradual
increase in the number of producers over time. As more producers compete in home markets, the
price of home varieties gradually falls together with marginal costs, leaving markups unchanged.
The Wicksellian policy is counter-cyclical, i.e. the home interest rate stays above the steady
state throughout the transition, while it is typically pro-cyclical in closed economies (see Bilbiie et
15In the US, the cyclical properties of ￿rms￿entry have been documented by, among others, Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson (1988), Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), Campbell (1998), Bilbiee et al. (2007) and Lewis (2009).
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Figure 1: Responses to 1 percent a rise in home productivity with Wicksellian policy (star marker),
Taylor rule (discontinuous line), smoothing rule (continuous line) and ￿xed exchange rates (cross
marker).
al. (2007)). Auray et al. (2010) obtain a similar ￿nding. Counter-cyclical interest movements are
a consequence of the incentive on the part of monetary authorities to exploit the terms of trade
spillovers that arise in open economies. With ￿ exible prices, an increase in the nominal interest rate
allows to improve the home terms of trade and reduce spreading the bene￿ts of the productivity rise
abroad.
Comparing the macroeconomic dynamics with sticky and ￿ exible prices reveals a number of
interesting features. Consistently with the business cycle properties already discussed, the responses
of entrants are far weaker when monetary policy follows any of the simple (non-optimal) rules
considered. The ￿nding is in contrast with previous models of endogenous entry, as Bilbiie et
al. (2007) and Auray et al. (2010), where the performance of the sticky price model is virtually
indistinguishable from that of the ￿ exible price economy in replicating the business cycle properties
of the data. In models with entry costs in units of labor, there is a direct link between share prices
and in￿ ation that is absent in my model. Consider, for instance, a drop in in￿ ation that raises the
real return on bonds. Arbitrage in ￿nancial markets requires a fall in the price of equity which, in
turn, induces potential entrants to invest in new varieties. Entry behaviour will be only marginally
a⁄ected by price stickiness whenever simple monetary rules manage to control in￿ ation, as it appears
to be e⁄ectively the case in these models. In my setup, instead, share prices are tied to the ￿xed cost
of entry and arbitrage in ￿nancial markets requires an increase in expected pro￿ts from investing in
a new ￿rm. Expected pro￿ts, in turn, di⁄er dramatically depending on whether prices are sticky or
22￿ exible. A given change in expected pro￿ts requires a much lower change in the number of producers
with sticky than with ￿ exible prices (i.e., the elasticity of pro￿ts to the number of producer is higher
under sticky prices).
Second, the responses of markups are counter-cyclical under simple monetary rules, as in the
data.16 In order to see why consider the price distortions that materialize with Calvo pricing.
Relative prices within a given period will di⁄er across ￿rms depending on whether they can adjust
the price of their own product, introducing a real distortion at the ￿rm level. In the aggregate,
home prices will fall on impact, driven by the decline in marginal costs as well as by the pro-
competitive e⁄ect of entry. Over time, as the number of producers returns to the steady state and
prices adjust, de￿ ation gradually disappears. The disconnect between prices and marginal costs
determines variable margins of pro￿ts throughout the transition. 17
Moreover, markups are more volatile in ￿ oating than in ￿xed regimes. This suggests that a pos-
itive relationship might exist between markup adjustment and (endogenous) changes in exchange
rates. Despite in my model export prices are ￿xed in the currency of producers, the dynamics of
markups is compatible with less than complete pass-through of exchange rate changes into con-
sumers￿prices. In this sense, the sharp drop in markups that materializes in ￿ oating regimes allows
to (partly) insulate ￿nal prices from exchange rate volatility. The interpretation is con￿rmed by
the fact that the standard deviation of exchange rates in my arti￿cial economy is larger than the
standard deviation of consumer prices under all simple monetary rules considered. 18 Markup ad-
justment in export markets is empirically plausible, as a wide evidence documents that international
goods markets are indeed segmented and pricing to market practices are widely di⁄used. 19
Third, changes in nominal exchange rates are highly persistent. This accords with a large evidence
16Studies based on di⁄erent methodological approaches converge on the view that markups are counter-cyclical in
major economies. In the US, this is indeed the case for studies that use mostly aggregate data as Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999b) as well as two digit industry level data as in Bils (1987). In an analysis that covers 14 OECD
countries and industry level data, Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) ￿nd counter-cyclical markups in 52 out of the
56 cases they consider.
17In models with quadratic costs of price adjustment, as Bilbiie et al. (2007), counter-cyclical markups may emerge
as a consequence of pro-cyclical movements in these costs. Markups are clearly constant under the optimal rule.
With ￿ exible prices, in fact, the rise in productivity reduces marginal costs and the relative price of each product in
exactly the same proportion, leaving markups unaltered at the ￿rm level and in the aggregate. This implies that all
relative prices adjust completely, i.e. they move one to one with the productivity shock, and so does the real value of
investments. Clearly, producer in￿ ation is zero.
18In models with a ￿xed number of varieties which do not explicitly allow for deviations from the law of one price,
as in Benigno and Benigno (2008), the volatility of consumer prices is bound to equalize the volatility of the nominal
exchange rate or, in other terms, the real exchange rate is constant.
19See Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Engel and Rogers (1996) and Campa and Goldberg (2005), among others.
Studying markup adjustment in the automobile export market of Japan, the US and Germany, Gagnon and Knetter
(1995) ￿nd that markup dynamics is in general compatible with pricing to market. The relation between markups
and exchange rates is particularly strong in Japan and to a lesser degree in Germany. It is virtually absent in US
export markets.
23documenting that nominal exchange rates among major currencies revert to the mean value with
very long lags. 20 In the model, non-stationarity derives from the state equation of the terms of trade
(26), which splits a given change in the terms of trade into changes in the nominal exchange rate
and in￿ ation di⁄erentials between countries. Although the terms of trade are stationary and revert
to the initial value after a shock, there is nothing in the ￿ oating regimes considered that forces the
exchange rate towards the initial steady state, unless in￿ ation rates are zero (as with the Wicksellian
policy). Mechanically, entry contributes to this non-stationarity by generating in￿ ation di⁄erentials
between countries. With sticky prices, monetary authorities have an incentive to move interest rates
pro-cyclically so as attract entry in domestic markets. Pro-cyclical interest rates movements, in turn,
exacerbate exchange rate volatility. Under ￿ exible prices, instead, interest rates are counter-cyclical.
These ￿ndings re￿ ect a di⁄erent orientation of monetary policy in ￿ oating regimes. In a world with
￿ exible prices, policy-makers passively accommodate changes in the natural interest rate (which
moves counter-cyclically) and let the exchange rate ￿ uctuate consequently. When prices are sticky,
on the contrary, they face a trade-o⁄ between the need to stabilize producer in￿ ation on the one
hand and to attract investments on the other hand.
In order to evaluate international co-movements, consider the responses of domestic macroeco-
nomic aggregates to a 1 percent rise in foreign productivity in Figure 2. The persistence of the shock
is 0.975 as in the Home country.
The boost in productivity has a positive impact on world consumption in all regimes, indepen-
dently of whether it originates at home or abroad. In ￿ oating regimes, the responses of consumption
are very close indeed to the responses in Figure 1. The motives are essentially the same: the rise
in productivity lowers real interest rates and attracts investments (abroad, in this case), thereby
stimulating world consumption.
The rise in foreign productivity propagates its e⁄ects worldwide through the movements in the
terms of trade and the standard expenditure switching e⁄ect. With ￿ exible prices, the deterioration
of the foreign terms of trade during most of the transition reduces the demand for home goods over
the whole investment horizon and results in a drop of home varieties. The sharp fall in the number
of home entrants, in turn, is responsible for the negative co-movements discussed earlier.
With sticky prices, the expenditure switching e⁄ect is dampened, especially in ￿ oating regimes
where the home currency depreciates. As a consequence, home agents moderately expand their
investments in new ￿rms. Investment and output co-movements are positive, in accordance with the
20In a famous paper, Meese and Rogo⁄ (1983) show that for major nominal exchange rates against the dollar a
random walk model outperforms any of the structural models within a one-year forecasting horizon.
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Figure 2: Responses to 1 percent a rise in foreign productivity with Wicksellian policy (star marker),
Taylor rule (discontinuous line), smoothing rule (continuous line) and ￿xed exchange rates (cross
marker).
evidence already discussed. This contrasts with the ￿nding in Auray et al. (2010). In their model,
as in my scenario with ￿ exible prices, negative output spillovers arise as a consequence of a (too)
sharp drop in home investments.
The responses of markups in Figure 2 are compatible with the idea of markup adjustment in
export markets as discussed above. In ￿ oating regimes, the rise in foreign productivity is associated
with higher in￿ ation in the partner country. Home producers, in fact, respond to the depreciation of
the home currency by raising the price of their products in domestic currency. Fewer home varieties
will therefore be produced and the markups of home producers will stay above the steady state in
the ￿rst stage of the transition. With ￿xed exchange rates, on the contrary, home producers need to
reduce the price of their products in order to maintain their competitivenness. Consequently, more
varieties will be produced and markups will fall throughout the transition.
4.3 Monetary policy shocks
In order to give more insights on the international monetary transmission with endogenous entry,
consider the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to monetary policy shocks. Figures 3 and 4 show
the responses to a one percent purely transitory fall in, respectively, domestic and foreign interest
rates. In this exercise, parameters are as in the standard calibration.21 The impulse responses are
21I have also experimented with di⁄erent combinations of the elasticities ￿ and ’, obtaining responses qualitatively
identical.
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Figure 3: Responses to a 1% fall in the home interest rate with producer in￿ ation target (continuous
line) and consumer in￿ ation target (dotted line)
calculated under interest rate smoothing with either a producer in￿ ation target (continuous line) or
a consumer in￿ ation target (discontinuous line).
The responses of consumption in Figures 3 and 4 are qualitatively similar as one would expect
with perfect risk sharing. The monetary expansion, wherever it is originated, boosts world demand
as long as prices are sticky, leading to a spike in world consumption in the early stage of the
transition. Over time, as prices slowly return to their natural levels, world consumption declines for
a while before converging to the steady state. Notice that despite the shock is purely transitory, the
dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates displays a signi￿cant degree of persistence as one observes
in the data.22
The rise in global consumption must be accommodated by a corresponding increase in global
output. Depending on the movements in the terms of trade, a given change in world consumption
can be associated with di⁄erent changes in home and foreign output.23 As long as the home terms
of trade improve, as under a monetary expansion abroad, home agents can work less for a given
level of consumption, raising their welfare at the expense of foreign consumers (the so-called terms
of trade externality). Clearly, the opposite occurs with deteriorating terms of trade. The country of
origin of the shock is therefore crucial for understanding monetary transmission in open economies.
To start with, focus on the home shock (Figure 3). The fall in the home interest rate leads to
22The responses with monetary rules that do not feature interest rate smoothing (available upon request) show
some persistence as well, albeit over a shorter time horizon.
23Given the assumption of costless trade, movements in the terms of trade are independent of changes in the relative
price of non-tradables in my model. The role of trade frictions in ￿rm entry and their implications for the transmission
of monetary policy shocks worldwide is ground for future research.
26a devaluation in the domestic currency via uncovered interest parity. Note that the devaluation
is persistent when the monetary target is producer in￿ ation. With consumer in￿ ation targeting,
instead, the exchange rate is ￿xed throughout the transition (except for a slight devaluation on
impact). The stabilization of consumer in￿ ation comes at the cost of an increase in producer in￿ ation.
Moreover, it a⁄ects how a given change in the terms of trade is split between exchange rate changes
and in￿ ation di⁄erentials. As I will discuss in a while, this has non-negligible consequences for
entry. Deteriorating terms of trade, in turn, shift demand in favor of home goods, while reducing
real wages (recall labor supply (14)) and increasing employment in the home economy (not shown
in Figure 3). In the absence of ￿xed costs, incumbent producers take advantage of the favorable
market conditions and increase investments along the intensive margin (not shown in Figure 3). The
response of entrants, on the contrary, is hump-shaped with a sharp drop in the early stage of the
transition and a moderate rise thereafter. This is a consequence of two opposing e⁄ects at work
in the model. On the one side, entrepreneurs are induced to start-up new ￿rms so as to exploit
the favorable business environment in the aftermath of the monetary easing. On the other side,
however, in￿ ation and deteriorating terms of trade raise the cost of new investments in terms of
output, thereby discouraging entry.24
In the data, the response of entry to monetary policy shocks is hump-shaped, suggesting that
in addition to entry costs other frictions may prevent potential investors from quickly exploiting
new pro￿t opportunities. My ￿ndings suggest that sticky prices may indeed be one such frictions.25
Empirical evidence further documents that entry reacts positively to an unexpected drop in the
nominal interest rate (see Bergin and Corsetti (2009), Lewis (2009) and Uusk￿la (2007)). This
might seems at odds with the response in Figure 3 (yet in line with the one in Figure 4). The
con￿ ict, however, is less severe than it might appear at ￿rst. Entry responds with a signi￿cant
lag in the data, implying that the theoretical responses are empirically plausible over the relevant
horizon.26 Moreover, the correlation between the number of entrants and nominal interest rates in
the model is negative as in the data.
Consider the responses of domestic variables to a monetary easing abroad (Figure 4). Consump-
tion bursts as before (recall complete risk-sharing) yet with opposing consequences for supply-side
variables. Now, the home terms of trade improve, thereby reducing the real cost of investments and
24In Bilbiie et al.(2007), ￿rms￿start-ups reduce throughout the whole transition. In their model, a monetary
expansion raises the real cost of investments via its e⁄ect on asset prices (a drop in the interest rate reduces the real
return on bonds and shares, therefore augmenting share prices and entry costs).
25Auray et al. (2010) similarly ￿nd that interest rate changes over the cycle (in response to productivity shocks in
their case) may raise entry costs long as prices are sticky. In their model, however, this e⁄ect is negligible.
26Using VAR estimates, Lewis (2009) shows that the response of entry to monetary policy shocks is signi￿cant only
at medium run horizons.
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Figure 4: Responses to a 1% fall in the foreign interest rate with producer in￿ ation target (continuous
line) and consumer in￿ ation target (dotted line)
inducing home entrepreneurs to start-up new production lines. I stress that the response of entrants
is particularly high whenever exchange rates are ￿xed as under consumer in￿ ation targeting. The
reason lies in the sharp fall in the price of domestic varieties (and hence in the real cost of starting
up a new production line) that materializes in this case. The ￿nding accords with a wide evidence
showing that exchange rate stability positively in￿ uences the extensive margin of trade, particularly
whenever there is a high degree of monetary policy coordination worldwide, as in monetary unions
and hard pegs.27
Comparing the responses of entry in Figures 3 and 4 reveals that a positive relationship exists
between movements in the terms of trade and investments along the extensive margin. Entry in
home markets is favored whenever the monetary expansion originates in the foreign country (and
is therefore associated with appreciating terms of trade) and the more so in ￿xed than in ￿ oating
regimes. The opposite occurs with a monetary easing at home. The ￿nding that the country of
origin of monetary uncertainty matters for the investments decisions of ￿rms in open economy is
compatible with a recent evidence documenting that an increase in monetary volatility may have
contrasting e⁄ects on the decision whether to invest abroad. 28
27Flam and Nordstrom (2006) show that the creation of the euro has led to an increase in trade along the extensive
margin. See also Berthou and FontagnØ (2008) and Auray et al. (2010). Bergin and Lin (2008) document that trade
￿ ows change mostly along the intensive or the extensive margin depending on the monetary regime in place. They
show that movements along the extensive margins are mainly associated with hard pegs while movements along the
intensive margin prevail under soft pegs.
28Russ (2009) ￿nds that exchange rate changes due to home monetary volatility deter US multinationals from
starting-up new facilities abroad while the opposite is true with an increase in foreign volatility. In a panel of OECD

























Terms of trade gap
Figure 5: Responses to a 1% rise in home productivity with entry (continuous line) and without
entry (dotted line)
Up to now, I have argued that monetary policy has a relevant in￿ uence on ￿rms￿dynamics. One
might wonder what implications this bears for monetary policy. In other terms, what happens if
monetary policy neglects the entry channel? In order to investigate the issue, I compare macroeco-
nomic dynamics in the model above with the one that would arise in the absence of an endogenous
response of entry. In this exercise, I focus on productivity shocks as the source of business cycle
volatility. Figure 5 shows the responses of consumption, output, the terms of trade and the nominal
interest rate to a 1% rise in home productivity in the model with entry (continuous line) and in the
model without entry (discontinuous line). Endogenous variables are normalized so as to express the
gap with respect to their natural counterparts. 29 All parameters are as in the standard calibration.
The monetary rule involves producer in￿ ation targeting and interest rate smoothing.
Interestingly, nominal interest rates respond less in the model without entry than in that with
entry. I have already argued that interest rates move counter-cyclically in the Wicksellian scenario
because of the terms of trade externality, (in this case, the rise in the interest rate is aimed at
appreciating the domestic currency and improving the home terms of trade so as to reduce the
bene￿ts of the productivity boost accruing abroad). Neglecting the impact of interest rate changes
on new investments further widens this gap (by a measure as high as 1.5 per cent) and results in a
sub-optimal response of the terms of trade. This in turn leads to an extremely slow adjustment of
economies, Cavallari and D￿ Addona (2010) show that FDI out￿ ows are discouraged by an increase in monetary
volatility in the source country. Changes in monetary volatility that originate in the destination country, instead, do
not appear to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect neither on the decision whether to invest abroad in the ￿rst place nor on the
amount of the investment.
29For each variable xt , the gap xGAP
t is de￿ned as xGAP
t = xt ￿ e xt .
29output (it takes approximately 40 periods for bridging the output gap in the model without entry
compared to 10 periods in the model with entry). The consumption gap, on the contrary, is almost
una⁄ected by entry.
5 Conclusions
This paper developed a model of international business cycle transmission with an endogenous num-
ber of producers and feedback monetary rules. The model shows that accounting for ￿rms￿ dynamics
under simple monetary rules allows to reproduce key facts of the international business cycle, out-
performing the typical open economy real business cycle model with a ￿xed number of variety along
several dimensions. Remarkably, I ￿nd that pro-cyclical entry and counter-cyclical markups give rise
to positive co-movements of macroeconomic aggregates over the cycle and stronger co-movements
of output relative to those of employment and investments, overcoming the well-known di¢ culty of
standard models in this regard. Moreover, my model can replicate the cyclical properties of the terms
of trade found in the data without resorting to implausible values for the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods.
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336 Appendix
6.1 A Steady state
I solve the model in logdeviation from the symmetric steady state equilibrium without in￿ ation
where CH = CF = C, Y H = Y F = Y , NH = NF = N, NEH = NEF = NE, LH = LF = L and






￿(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1+’￿)(1￿￿)# 1
(1+’￿)(￿￿1)+1+’




; v = 1; d =
(1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))

















1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)





; L = ￿dN
2￿￿





6.2 B Loglinear model
TBW
34